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The International Organization of Securities Commissions published a 63-page report on Thursday describing quantum computing as a significant medium- to long-term cybersecurity challenge for financial markets, Bitcoin Magazine reported. The global body for securities regulators said no practical quantum computer able to compromise widely used cryptography exists today, but argued that preparation cannot wait for one to appear.
“The scale and duration of the transition mean the financial sector should start preparing today,” IOSCO board chair Jean-Paul Servais said in the release accompanying the report. The study drew on a survey of IOSCO members and interviews with industry experts and market participants. Unchained reported that the document urges authorities and market participants not to wait for cryptographically relevant quantum computers before starting preparedness and migration planning, and it warned of the risk of a cryptographic zero-day.
Also read: XRP Ledger Outlines Quantum-Resistant Upgrade for 2028
Key facts
- IOSCO published its final report on quantum readiness on November 19, 2026; the findings rest on a member survey plus interviews with industry experts and market participants.
- Preparedness across the financial sector is at an early stage, with most firms still raising awareness, setting up governance and taking cryptography inventories while migration testing and rollout stay limited.
- Signatures under ML-DSA-44, a post-quantum standard from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, run about 2,420 bytes — roughly 35 to 40 times the 64-byte signatures common today.
- Testing on Solana’s quantum-resistant testnet showed throughput falling by about 90%, according to the report.
- Conservative estimates place machines capable of breaking today’s cryptography in the 2030–2035 window, though some participants told IOSCO to plan for the next five years, possibly accelerated by artificial intelligence.
Why blockchains face a harder migration
IOSCO said the problem is sharper for public blockchains because cryptography is embedded in their core design. Swapping it out requires hard forks and coordinated action across thousands of independent validators and node operators, and decentralized networks have no mechanism to force a fast upgrade — a process the report said could prove slow and fragmented. The larger signatures could in turn strain throughput, storage and fees.
The report flagged assets whose public keys are already visible, noting a capable attacker could derive private keys from them, and that uneven migration could leave those holdings exposed. Dormant or abandoned coins tied to exposed keys may be hardest to move if holders cannot be identified or cannot act. IOSCO did not name bitcoin; its blockchain examples were Ethereum, Solana and Tron, and Unchained noted that the national and cross-border timelines summarized in the report do not specifically address public blockchains.
According to Unchained, the report’s authors wrote that “immediate action is required” and that attackers will not need to own a quantum computer to use one. It also warned of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, in which data collected today is unlocked later, and noted that ledger data copied today cannot be protected by a later upgrade.
Satoshi-era coins and a coming debate
Bitwise chief investment officer Matt Hougan, speaking on Unchained on November 9, described quantum as mostly a migration risk rather than a meltdown risk — except for bitcoin’s Satoshi-era coins and pre-2015 coins, where he expects a very challenging community discussion soon.
Bitcoin’s exposure has been quantified. Jameson Lopp estimated in May that about 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of supply, sat in outputs with exposed public keys, including early pay-to-public-key coins and reused addresses. Proposals exist but none is active: BIP 360 would add a Taproot-like output type with no exposed public key and has been deployed by BTQ Technologies on a separate test network, while BIP 361, co-authored by Lopp, is a draft to phase out legacy signatures. BIP 360 would not protect coins whose keys are already exposed. Lopp wrote in September that waiting until a quantum attacker is visible would leave the worst set of possible choices.
What regulators are being told
IOSCO stopped short of setting rules. It called on firms to begin migrating to post-quantum cryptography and to build crypto-agility — the ability to swap algorithms without a major redesign — and said migration should end by retiring every remaining use of vulnerable cryptography. It told securities regulators to scrutinize firms’ quantum disclosures and act against “quantum washing,” where companies overstate what their quantum products can do. Unchained reported that Israel already requires banks and licensed payment providers to submit board-reviewed preparedness plans to their supervisor, and that some firms described “quantum-procrastination” while awaiting clearer regulatory signals. Firms cited reliance on third parties, interoperability gaps, limited expertise and unclear timelines as obstacles.
Why it matters
The warning shifts quantum from a theoretical cryptography debate into a planning problem for banks, brokers, exchanges and the public chains they touch. For decentralized networks, the report makes clear that the hard part is not choosing an algorithm but coordinating thousands of independent operators with no central authority to compel an upgrade. That leaves holders of exposed coins, and the regulators who oversee the venues trading them, carrying risk that cannot be resolved by a single vendor patch.
What to watch
IOSCO said it will keep quantum as a priority in 2027, and it described the report as a basis for future work on post-quantum readiness and international cooperation. Watch for regulators acting on the report’s call to review quantum disclosures, and for any of the draft Bitcoin proposals moving from the drafting stage toward activation.
Reported by Bitcoin Magazine.

